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In the history of South Africa, the Griqua have a symbolic role far 
outwei&ing their actual importance in the development of the country. As 
perhaps the richest, as well as the fairest, coloured group within South Africa, 
their outcasting represents the decision of the white power block not to 
assimilate blacks en masse into the ranks of the governors, but rather to 
maintain a somewhat mythical white supremacy. (1) This paper is an attempt to 
describe the defeat of the Griqua Captaincy of Philippolis, which was established 
to the north of the Orange River in the 1820s and which remained a refuge for 
those forced out of the Cape Colony by the increasing racial pressures there. 
Finally, the spread of these same pressures dislodged the Captaincy so that it 
was driven to trek en bloc over the Drakensberg into Nomansland, subsequently 
renamed East Griqualand. 
It is argued that it was the consciousness that the surrounding whites 
had of the Griqua as ethnically different from themselves that caused them to 
look upon the Griqua community as a competitor for the rich sheep lands of the 
southern Free State rather than accept the considerable number of individual 
Griqua who conformed to all other criteria of "~ivilization'~ as equal members 
of the larger social entity that ruled South Africa. This competition became 
increasingly keen, in a process that has a nwnber of parallels elsewhere in the 
development of colonial societies, after the growth of a widespread and 
moderately large-scale expansion within and around the Griqua community. 
Throw this expansion, a considerable degree of interdependence was established 
so that the political power of the whites allowed them to manipulate the 
relationship until they were able to force the Griqua into a situation where 
tnere remained only two equally invidious choices. Either thejr could watch 
their society disintegrate around them and expect that, after their unity had 
gone, those who survived with some de,gcee of wealth intact would be elimimted 
slowly and individually, or they could attempt to trasplm-t their corrununit:,- 
into the new and superficially attractive soil of Nomansland. They chose the 
latter. 
On a simple level, the explanation for the Griqua decline is readily 
apparent. The development of the Afrikaner republics and the establishment, by 
Noshoeshoe, of hegemony over many of the disparate Sotho-Tswana groups of the 
Caledon River valley and the Drakensberg foothills altered the political 
environment in Transorangia as the whole scale of political interaction 
increased dramatically. Thus, without any diminution in their own resources - 
in fact, 2s will be shorn, the opposite was the case - the Griqua of Philippolis 
ceased to be able to determine the course of events. This was aggravated by 
the fact that they lay athwart the path of the northward expansion of the Boers. 
From the foundation of Philippolis in the mid-1820s onwards, the Trekboers had 
been crossing the Orange in search of water and pasturage for their herds, to 
escape the devastations of springbok treks, locusts and drought. (2) Initially, 
there was conflict between the trekkers and the Griqua, but this settled down 
through the 1830s, and by 1840 a modus vivendi had been established. (3) They 
lived much the same sort of life as the Griqua, being nomadic pastoralists, and 
they recognized the authority of the Griqua over the land in which they were 
forced to live, paying rent for the use of farms that was at first intermittent 
but became increasingly permanent as a considerable comunity of Boers built up 
along the Riet River. By 1842, the emigrant Boers claimed to have paid the 
Griqua fractionally over £5,000 for the hire of some 105 farms, for periods 
raxging up to 45 years. (4) Even so, the Boers never admitted any Griqua 
authority over their persons, and indeed it is by no means certain whether they 
admitted that of anyone apart from their own leader, Hichiel Oberholster. (5) 
The tensions between Boer and Griqua, which were al~~a&rs present in the 
relationship of the two distinct groups utilizing the same natural resources, 
were very considerably exacerbated after 1842, when the British annexation of 
Natal caused militant republicans to trek back over the Drakensberg into the 
northern Free State and the southern Transvaal. Increasingly these voortrekkers 
came into conflict with the Griqua, as men like Jan Kock and Jan Mocke attempted 
to include all the land north of the Orange River, thus including the Griqua 
territory, in an Afrikaner republic. In this they were thwarted primarily 
because the British, in treaty relationship with the Griqua, became increasingly 
embroiled. Once it became evident that the British were prepared to use troops 
to quell Boer unrest north of the Orange, which was the case after 1843 when a 
detachment was sent up to Colesberg in case of need, the Griqua, in accordance 
with their agreements with the British, had the confidence to assert their 
authority over the so-called British subjects - in other words, the 
voortrekkers - within their boundaries. In consequence, in 1845, British troops 
were once more sucked north of the Orange and, after a short skirmish at 
Zwartkoppies, the dissident Boers were driven out of Griqua territory, into tne 
Transvaal. (6) 
In many ways the whole episode would appear to have been a success for 
the Griqua, as it led to the expulsion of their main rivals for control over the 
southern Free State. In fact, the reverse was to prove the case. In order to 
lessen the chances of their being forced to move north again, the British not 
only established a resident north of the Orange - in itself an almost certain 
guarantee of further entanglements, especially as the post was long held by a 
man of almost unrelieved incompetence, Major Henry Warden (7) - but also imposed 
a settlement of affairs between the Boers and the Griqua that was to lead to 
continual trouble. By the Maitland Treaty of 1846 ( 8 ) ,  the Griqua territory was 
divided into two sections. In the northern part Griqua were to be allowed to 
lease out land, while the area south of the line was to be reserved for Griqua 
alone. In principle, this seems to have been a reasonable measure, ensuring that 
part at any rate of the Griqua country remained sacrosanct, for tney could not 
hope to retain control of the considerable territory, stretching north to the 
Modder River, that they had claimed but could not by any means utilize. In the 
event, considerable problems arose from the fact that the boundaries of the 
Inalienable Territory in no \my coincided with the division between Griqua and 
Boer areas, as  marked out in the agreement between Adam Kok and Oberholster of 
1840. (9) The consequence was tha t  some 596 (85 out of 143) of those f a m s  tha t  
had been l e t  were within the Inalienable Territory, while only 40% (58 out of 
146) of the farms i n  the Alienable Territory had been leased. (10) The problem 
was made worse when S i r  Harry Smith s e t  up the Orange River Sovereignty two 
years la te r .  By threatening t o  hang them a l l  (11) , he extorted from Adam Kok 
and h is  council an agreement whereby such farms as were leased by the Griqua 
fo r  $0 years or  more, 42 i n  a l l ,  were to  be converted t o  freehold, and then 
proceeded to  t r ea t  a l l  the farms within the Alienable Territory, another 104, 
of which 16 had been l e t  fo r  shorter periods, as  f a l l i n g  within t h i s  category, 
thereby depriving the Griqua of a very considerable area of land. (12) \hen, 
some 6 years l a t e r ,  the Bri t ish government, i n  one of the reversals of policy 
that bedevilled i t s  actions i n  South Africa, scut t led out of the Or=@ River 
Sovereignty, the Griqua once again l o s t  out. Not only did they f a i l  to  recover 
the f ams  that they had been swindled out of, being l ibera l ly  insulted by the 
Bri t ish Resident in to  the bargain (13), but also such land as was sold by Griqua 
passed out of the jurisdiction of Adan Kolr t o  that of the Orange Free State,  
i n  eccordance with an agreement that  was not published u n t i l  1657. (14) 
The l i ne  of argument that  they l o s t  t he i r  land, and consequently t he i r  
po;;.er, through the double dealing of the British government has considerable 
attractions.  It was, f o r  instance, believed by Adam ICok himself, v:lio dra.gged 
i t  out on various more or  less  suitable occasions. (15) An analytic vier: of 
the rhole episode perhaps would rather s t ress  the need of the Bri t ish to  avi.tch 
collaborators when it was proved tiia,t the Griqua were unable to  control tlie 
area north ol' tile Orange to  degree, and lay l e s s  emphasis on 3r i t i s i l  9erfid:- 
t l ~ n  KO!: =id h is  mission apologists (16), but the general effect  would be t"e 
sane. Ultimately, it was the control that  -the whites possessed over the 
Pol i t icnl  E:in,don and exercised i n  the way outlined above t l a t  led t o  tlie 
Griq~m defeat, but such an explanation by i t s e l f  i s  too simple. I f  e i ther  the 
sovth of ne;r po l i t ies  that might, i n  a Social Darwinian sense, be seen to  be 
conpeting with the Griqua o r  the loss  of land and power owing t o  the machinations 
and mistakes of pol i t ic ians were held to  account f o r  the fa i lure  of the G r i g u a  
cz,-&aincy a d  i t s  t rek into TTomansland, then it v~ould be eesy to  predict that  
the period a f t e r  1854 would be one of decline on a l l  fronts.  In fzc t ,  exce?'~ 
in so f a r  as diplomatic t~e i&t  was concerned, the opposite was tile case. It 
i s  t;ms necessary t o  view the effects  of tne loss of land ill a, f z r  nore 
sopllisticated framework i f  any sense i s  to  be made of the developrncatc as  a 
rhole. 
;i. B. Philip,  the l a s t  n in is te r  to  the Griqm a t  Ylzilingolic, l n t e r  
recorcled liis neinories of l i f e  i n  and axound the torn1 j-n the 1xt ;em23 ol' i t s  
occ"~patlon. IIe mo te  as f ollo~rs  :
"About the time th i s  noveaent was necessitated, 
the people were i n  a prosperous s t a t e ;  they had 
t i t l e s  t o  t he i r  fams,  i n  which they had bu i l t  
substantial  c o t t a ~ s  and out-buildings; orc;izrds, 
stocked with good f r u i t  t rees ,  garden pounds and 
land f o r  cultivztion ::ere i n  m a y  cases enclosed 
with stone ~ i a l l s ;  good stone lcraals and one or  
two W s  were t o  be found on nost fams;  tzoops 
of from twenty t o  one hundred horses, about tlie 
same number of ca t t l e ,  and hundreds of well-bred 
woolled sheep, were running on these farms, and 
maqr a man brought h i s  ten, f i f teen ,  twenty, and 
twenty f ive bales of li001 f o r  sale  a t  once; 
while the shopkeepers found them as good 
custoners for clothing, groceries, saddlery, 
carts, and furniture as a,.~ of the Boers. Of 
course there were many poor people, whose 
poverty had been brought on by their own 
laziness, pride and drunkenness. (17) 
The impression he gives is substantiated by the actual figures for the 
subscription to the church, which run as follotrs: 1856 £381; 1857 £457; 1858 
£511; l859 £584; l860 £612 (18) - and by a letter from Philippolis after the 
Griqua had left, which considered that several of the 6 stores in the town were 
likely to fold up as "Merchants and others are now feeling the truth that the 
Griqua nation have left, and where many shops here took a few months agb cash 
sales of £15 or £20 per diem, they now take about as many shillings. (19) It is 
true that the takings of shops during 1861 would have been increased by Griqua 
using the proceeds of their final winding up to provision themselves for the 
trek, but the general picture is nevertheless clear. 
There would thus seem to exist the considerable paradox that 
simultaneously with the very considerable diminution of power of the Griqua 
Captaincy of Philippolis its wealth increased to a level unprecedented in the 
group's adnittedly short history. In order to resolve this seeming contradiction, 
it is necessary to examine closely the bases of Griqua wealth that mushroomed 
from around 1850. 
Primarily this new prosperity was founded on wool. Hobart Houghton 
has pointed out that "the economic impact of international markets was carried 
into the interior not in the waggons of the Voortrekkers but upon the backs of 
merino sheep" (20), and it would appear to have reached the Griqua as soon as 
it did their Boer neighbours. It is true that some Griqua derived considerable 
profit from various subsidiary activities. There is a certain amount or" evidence 
that they conducted a moderately large trade in horses, which were driven as far 
as Barotseland, and,as they lived on the northern limits of the area that is 
permanently free from horse-sicaess, such activity is inherently likely. (21) 
Similarly, a certain income was no doubt derived from trading and transport 
riding. As early as 1843 the comaunity had as many as 50 waggons and received 
£538 for their use by the British forces who rere coming to protect them. There 
is also much evidence of the Griqua role in the opening of the interior of 
Southern Africa, particularly in the penetration of 1Tgarniland and Barotseland 
from the south, and such activity was, of course, undertaken primarily in search 
of ivory and other trade goods. Though most of the individuals in question 
appear to have been baseless or to have hailed from Griquatown (23), some at 
least of the prominent Griqua of Philippolis also took part. (211;) Nevertheless, 
it was from woolled sheep that the Griqua gained their considerable income. In 
early 1856 some 200 bales of wool were sent soutin, at a value of about £2,000, 
and it would appear that the total rose considerably after that. (25) 
Simultaneously, of course, the Free State Boers were also turning over to merino 
sheep, but there is nothing to suggest that they reacted appreciably faster than 
the Griqua to the new opportunities. (26) 
Xov this raises the very considerable problem as to ho~r the Griqua were 
able to buy the merino rams from which to breed their flocks. It should be 
pointed out that the Griqua were not dependent on their flocks a d  herds for 
subsistence, as to a large extent they lived off the game that still abounded in 
the Free State. Indeed, their continual demand for ammunition supplies, and the 
repeated attempts of the Orange Free State government to persuade the Cape 
Colony not to allow this, may have been occasioned by the desire to mintain 
control over the herds of game and thus allow the build-up of sizable flocks. (27) 
In other words, anns and ammunition were seen as much, if not more, the means 
of production as  the means of destruction. It i s  a lso true that  the flocks tha t  
produced the rrool vere i n  f ac t  brought into being by the crossing of the hairy 
Cape sheep that  formed the original Griqua herds with a sna l l  number ol" merino 
rams. (28) There a re  no figures fo r  the proportion of wool-bearing sheep mong 
the Griq-m - indeed, there i s  no rel iable  estimate f o r  the t o t a l  number of 
Griq~xi sheeq - but some indication of the speed of the spread of t i e  merinos 
m y  be glemed from the Free State stock census of 1856 ( 2 9 )  : by that  time 
87.5:' (1,011,603 out of 1,155,533) of the sheep belonginc to  E1rce State burghers 
were described as wolgevende, and it inay be surmised tha t  a v e r j  large poport ion 
of these ::ere the product of crosses betrreen nej-ino rams and h a i r j  - or, i n  time, 
ila,ll"-caste - zhec?. 
;:evertheless, the e:rpenditure necessary to  build up the Griqua f loc l :~  
 as c~nsicicj?able. In  1855, Io r  instance, the bcst 3 a o n  rams were se l l ing  i n  
Bloe~lIontein for  between 240 m6 253. (30) To add to the dil ' f iculties oi" 
aLEscing L11s necessa,q money, the 1S;lOs l ~ d  been a period of conr;iZLer~.blc 
ka,~Cn:lia fo:: the Griqm, p r h a r i l ' j  i n  consequence of tllo 13oli lica.1 d i:; -l.'~~nbaiccs 
of thzt-deczdc, r3ich not infrequen5lj coincided with droudlt. (31) Sone 
evidence o; t h i s  c m  be seen from the fac t  that the &iqw had on occas i~ i l  t o  
request Tron the Civil  Commissioner of Colesberg the means where+riti~ to  nurchase 
ammunition, which was i n  the circumstz?ncos a necessity of l i f e ,  and trit!lout doqd.bt 
the f i r c t  7 r ior i ty  f o r  Griqua cash. (32) There could be no ;,lore te1lin:p; i~ldez: 
of t he i r  lack o; l iquid i22nds. 
It tras not that the Griqua \rere t o t a l ly  rqithout resources, kit : ~ ~ . ' c l y  
tkat  the coiloiderable resources i n  l m d  tilet they ~ O E S ~ S S P ~  krere not bei:~,;. 
ut i l ized iii such c ?&ray as  to  pprcclcce ei-ther a steady inconc o r  LW ncc~w; i~~ l~ t ion  
i n  the ca,?itel. They were, s o  to  s3eak, frozen, m d  coulir be r,lade productLre 
onQ ifileil fmt:ler c z ~ i t n l ,  bcciczllg i n  the form of productive stock, cov-l& be 
injected. 
1.t ~rould tllus a,pFep,r t112,t i;ke C-riqw were c%ugY~ ia a vicioxs c i rc lo  , 
ill +,- "L., .L . tliey 7- tie-% ~ a , 5 l e  t o  r.lp!r.e i7roicuc.tive use of t!?cir lmdz ;:rit::out larce 
floclrn of n e ~ i n o  sheep, that  they could a l l y  develop ~ r i t : _ l  the 2roduc.tn of 'kit 
l md.. Tl~e::e t r ~ . ~ ,  l~oy.:ever, one to  5realc the ci::'cle, and t h i s  vms She cne - 
++t ,- .., , ..,, ?-m zc tml ly  ado2ted: to  alierxite t he i r  o-cn land a d  to  invest tl?e rent 
0:: "ilc 3rccecds o:i the ca.lez i n  the c?Leveloping of flrlly prochctiiie Tlocko 
o t h e ~  fr?,ms. Yet, while t h i s  led to  a brief f lo~ier inc  of Grique >real-!&, i - k  
ha?. politl.cz1 consequences thct  sere  f ina l ly  t o  ruin the Griq=l7. 
Unfort~ulately, it i s  inpoccible to denonntrate absolutely t;lzt S ~ I C ~  n 
2rocess occ~rred .  A l l  f i a t  can be done i s  t o  point t o  the f ac t  thc t  tilerc nu.::t 
h?,ve bceii a considerable injection of cash into the Griqua econoq z t  thi:: t ine; 
that  thir, could not have 5een aca_uized thou& agriculture,  trhich !:a.: aly-zys 
uncertain a ~ o m &  Philippolis (37) ; md tha t  i t  s eens higllly unli!:el.y that  there 
Iran a sufTicient volme of trade :rith the area north of the Orms f o r  tne Cri~m 
cut to  hzve been sucficient For ths  yrpose .  it c m ,  h o ~ ; e ~ e r ,  bc c lmn  tkzt  the 
Gria.~~, d-id receive very considerable Evms f o r  the h i r iw  and snle sf the: r lzr~d. 
Bj  1312, accordin5 to  ?.dm 1;okls Lir ts ,  a t o t a l  of C5,01-0 had Seen 2niS- -to 
Griqm f o r  the h i re  of t h e i r  land, r.!hile data on $he sale  of l a d s ,  alt;l~u:ll 
inccr;lylete, ziT7e a ninirrm f i,we of Z27,OGO received by the G r i o  the end 
of 1855. 
There remain kro problems ~ r i t h  such an in t eq re t a t ion .  In the f i r s t  
?lace, i t  has t o  be shotm tha t  there remained suff ic ient  123.6 f o r  the G~iqua 
thsnselves to  f lourish on, although the f ac t  tha t  they did would apyear -to be 
suff ic ient  proof. i n  fac t ,  some 143 farms \rere hired out, a l l  bcforc the 
establishment of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1848. Another 88 were lost to 
them by the arrangement of Sir Harry ;Smith in that year, and there were also 
some 63 sold during the subsequent seven years. It would not, however, appear 
that there was great land shortage among the Griqua: 122 farms remained, 
mainly in the vicinity of Philippolis itself, and generally in the south-east of 
the old Griqua domain. In any case, much of the land that was hired or sold to 
the Boers had never been utilized anyway, but was merely part of the Griqua 
territorial claims that had been agreed to from c. 1830 onwards. It may be, 
however, that such land would have been taken into production by younger sons 
and immigrants from the colony, and that the lack of such'land built up pressures 
within the colony that had some part in impelling the Griqua to trek to 
ITomansland . 
Secondly, it can be shown that m a n y  individuals who sold or hired land 
had access to other farms on which they could run those sheep that - according 
to our hypothesis - they bought with the proceeds of their land sales. Ioreover, 
it is highly likely that the sheep were allowed to run on the farms of relatives 
or friends, This certainly appeass to have been the case in East Griqualand 
after the trek. Thus, the fact that a man did not formally possess a farm need 
not have precluded his making a considerable income from the profits of sheep- 
fanning. 
If, then, there was a certain rationale for all Griqua to alienate a 
certain section of their land to acquire the capital with vrhich to utilize the 
rest, it should also be realized that the society was not economically 
homogeneous. Here again data are, to all intents and purposes, non-existent, a d  
a fair degee of a priori reasoning unfortunately becomes necessary to elucidate 
various events, but the distinction that was frequently drawn between the Griqua - 
"an indolent people neither understanding nor caring for the value of landtt - 
and the Bastards - "the more civilised portion . . . of colonial descent" (34) - 
would appear to gain such validity as it has from nascent economic stratification 
rather than from racial divergence. It can thus be assumed that the great 
expansion of the G~iqua cash economy was attended by the development of sizable 
wealth differentials within the comnmity, although it would be a mistake to 
consider that they had been non-existent earlier. The vagaries of disease, 
pasture, w a r  and personality would bring this about. It is thus highly likely 
that some of the Griqua who held land would, from time to time, become destitute, 
or, at any rate, would not be able to live at the level of considerable display 
to which the community as a whole was becoming accustomed. (35) It is, therefore, 
to be expected that they would sell their land, which, in the circumstances and 
given the availability of credit, they could only do to whites. Thus, yet more 
of the Griqua pbied would be alienated and ~rould never return to Griqua hands. 
In this way, the contradiction between the homogeneity necessary to preserve the 
integrit-J of the Griqua power a3ld the heterogeneity of economic status 
consequent upon the development of large-scale cash farming led further to the 
erosion and destruction of Griqua power. 
men the material is shorn of its details and reduced to a pattern, it 
rsould appear that tnere were three stages in the process whereby the introduction 
of a lzrge-scale cash nexv-S north of the Orange led to the Griqua Seing forced 
to leave that region. 
1) With the growth of new economic opportunities, a quick response was 
made, at any rate by some individuals within the society, leading in all 
_?robability to a considerable increase in internal stratification, xrliich Clivcrpd 
somewhat from the pre-existing patterns. The Griqua were, moreover, dependent 
on the white-dominated economy of the Ccpe Colony, to which they nay be see11 to 
be in tne position of satellite, and their o ~ m  economy owed its origin to a 
large degree to the surrounding Sfrikaner population, who both provicled ca~ital, 
al5eit unwittingly, and formed a community large enough to persuade Cape 
nerclmts to extend their operations northward. 
2) This initial influence mve tne white power bloc, both of the Cape 
Colony,where the government was becoming increasingly conscious of its relimce 
on local agricultural and commercial interests (36), and of the Orange Free 
State, wlxich was dominated by tile Griquats ma,in conpetitors (37), a lever 
wherewith to exercise over the Griqua an influence that was increased by their 
own reluctance to jeopardize their newly acquired standard of living. In z q r  
case they were too weak in numbers to cope effectively in any nilitarj sense. 
Thus the whites were able to put throu& the various measures that successively 
deprived the Griqua of large parts of tlieir land, trhile the only opposition thzt 
presented to them was but inefzective invective. 
3) In time, the situation becae so intolerable for the nass of the Griqua 
that, against the advice of the missiona,ries (38) and to the detriment of their 
irimdiate economic situation, they trekked over the Drakensberg. Only in thin 
way could they naintain themselves as the political unit they had been for the 
previous 35 years, and no doubt they recognized that, without some such 
political bloc, the wealth of those who hzd it would be slowly whittled aliqr. 
The alternative to trekking could only have been to remain behind in 
the Free State and watch the de,&tion of many Griqua while a proportion 
remined wealthy. They understood that the relation of imperium in imperio in 
which they stood to the Free State was inherently unstable, and the timing of 
their exodus is probably explained as much by the failure of Sir George Grey's 
federation scheme of 1859 as by the publication of the secret clauses of the 
Bloemfontein convention. Undoubtedly, they realized that acceptance into the 
Afrilcaner c o d t y  of the Oran@ Free State was impossible. Sir Charles Warren 
described colonial opinion accurately when he claimed that, athough the 
Griqua "... is just as white in ;;lany cases as the darker Boer and quite as much 
civilized, yet he must be classed among the blacks and have no right to land", (39) 
Griqua society had been founded and had prospered as a refuge from the growing 
discrimination in the Colony. Despite its economic flowering, it fell when that 
society once more engulfed it. 
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Author's Rote 
In the face of considerable criticism when this paper was presented and 
of a re-examination of much of the material, I would now be unhappy to let this 
piece go into penaanent form as it stands. As considerable rewriting would 
otherwise be necessary, I have decided it would be best merely to append this 
note of correction. 
In mneral, I still stand by the main tenets of the argument, as put 
fonlrard in the schema of pages 14 & 15. I am, however, increasingly dubious about 
the motor for this model, as I have propounded it. I do not now see that land 
sales served the function that I suggested within this paper, namely the source 
of cash with which to buy rams. In part, this was because I overlooked the 
alternative sources of income available to the Griqua, which stemmed from a 
succession of the best harvests that Philippolis ever had, coupled with the 
possibilities for trading and transport riding subsequent on the greater 
commercial development of the Orange River Sovereignty. Also, of course, the 
activities of the British troops in the campaigns against the Sotho may very well 
have provided considerable opportunities for Griqua to cash in on the need for 
S-~nnl ies .  I n  par t ,  too, I exagmrated the speed of the  change-over f'r-n ha i ry  
t o  mes;no sheen, and i n  consequence overestimated the  amount of money Chat was 
req1~:yed i n  a short  space of time. This is  not t o  say that no Griqua used the  
proceeds of  land a l j ena t ion  i n  order t o  make t h e i r  own farms more ~ r o d u c t i v e .  
S i r  i'mdries Stclcicenstrom even suggested t h a t  s i~ch  a process was p i n g  on during 
the  f i r s t  meetlngs ~f Griqua and Boer i n  the  l a t e  1820s. But tlie emphasis I 
 laced on it bras tno great .  
The defeat  of the  Griq1.1;~ aspisa t ions  despi te  t h i s  short  boom would, 
therefo-e, seem tp be primaxi1.y more conseqilential npon the p a r t i c u l a r  
development of the p o l i t i c a l  process. Specif ica l ly ,  Griqua fea r s  over the  
establishment o f  the  Orange Free S ta te  were always considerable and never al layed.  
It is  hi gl-l y s ign i f i can t  tha t  i n  the  immediate aftermath of the establishnent of 
the Free Sta te ,  i n  1851, there  was a pl.ethora of land sa les .  The Griqua were 
evidently not expectin,.: t o  stw. Edward Solomon, the  missionary, was repor t ing 
t h a t  na,rtici?.lar Iyroups within the  Griqua community were deciding whether t o  
ernipate,  and i f  so where to.  Also,  it is  s ign i f i can t  that the  f i n a l  decision t o  
t re l -  t o  East Griq~laland ~ w s  taken at the  time of the f a i l u r e  of S i r  George Grey's 
federation scheme, and the e lec t ion  of ivkrthinus Wessels Pretor ius  as President 
of the Orange Free S ta te ,  which was loolced on as presaging a united 3oer republic 
from t h ~  Orantp t p  the Limpopo. Probably i t  was only the  merSno boom which kept 
then so l o n ~ .  
